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Sexually Violent Predator Statutes Unnecessarily Expands
State Civil Commitment Power
In 1993, just days before her twentieth birthday, Stephanie
Schmidt was brutally raped and murdered by Don Gideon, a co-
worker who had recently been released from jail after serving a
sentence for rape.' In response to the tragedy, her parents, Gene and
Peggy Schmidt, formed the Task Force on Sexual Offenders and
lobbied Kansas lawmakers to pass a package of tough legislation
targeting sex offenders.2 That package included the Sexually Violent
Predator Act ("the Act"),3 which allowed for the involuntary civil
commitment of sex offenders upon completion of their criminal
sentences.' In 1995 Leroy Hendricks became the first sex offender
committed under the Act.5
Hendricks was the type of criminal that Stephanie's father
described as the "worst of the worse" because of his propensity to
continue committing sex crimes.' During his commitment hearing,
Hendricks did not dispute such a characterization, testifying that only
1. See Kelly A. McCaffrey, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators in
Kansas: A Modem Law for Modem Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 887 (1994); Greg
Kuhl & Robert A. Cronkleton, Employer Unaware of Gideon's Record, KAN. CITY STAR,
July 29, 1993, at CI; 60 Minutes: Stephanie's Law (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 11,
1998) [hereinafter 60 Minutes].
2. See McCaffrey, supra note 1, at 887; Jim Sullinger, Tough Laws Urged for Sex
Offenders, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 3, 1993, at C1 (detailing the efforts of two legislators to
propose bills on behalf of the task force).
3. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a17 (1994 & Supp. 1997). Since its
enactment, the Kansas legislature has made several amendments to the Act. For
instance, as originally enacted, the Act provided that the prosecuting attorney in the
county where the offender was originally charged receive notice of a sexual predator's
pending release 60 days prior to that release. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1994).
Currently, however, notice of a sexual predator's pending release must be given to the
state attorney general 90 days prior to the release. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03
(Supp. 1997). Perhaps the most significant change since enactment is the addition of a
multidisciplinary team to make a preliminary determination of whether the offender in
question satisfies the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator. See id. § 59-
29a03(d)-(e).
4. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (Supp. 1997) (setting out the process by which
the attorney general is notified of the defendant's release from prison); id. §§ 59-29a04 to
-29a07 (describing the process of civil commitment).
5. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,2076 (1997).
6. See 60 Minutes, supra note 1 (interviewing Gene Schmidt as to why he lobbied for
passage of the Act).
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death could guarantee that he would not molest again.' Between
1955 and 1984 he was convicted six times for molesting children as
young as seven years old,8 a record that further validated a label of
"the worst of the worse." Nonetheless, Hendricks challenged the Act
alleging that it violated his rights under the Due Process, Ex Post
Facto, and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution.9 The
Kansas Supreme Court agreed and struck down the Act on due
process grounds,10 but, in a five-to-four decision in Kansas v.
Hendricks," the United States Supreme Court reversed. 2
This Note explores the facts of Hendricks, including the
circumstances that led to Hendricks's commitment and the
procedures demanded by the Act. 3  Next, the Note traces the
development of substantive due process requirements for involuntary
civil commitment proceedings ranging from those mandated by
sexual psychopath statutes to those used for the continued
confinement of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity. 4
The Note also takes a close look at the Court's process for
determining whether a sanction is civil or punitive either in intent or
effect. 5 Finally, the Note considers the ramifications of the Court's
ruling in Hendricks.6  Specifically, the Note considers the
consequences of confining people based upon a "personality defect"'17
as well as the potential for dealing with dangerous repeat sexual
offenders through hybrid sanctions that draw from both criminal and
civil models. 8
Sexually violent predator statutes represent one of several
attempts by state and federal government to protect the public from
sexual offenders.'9 When the Court decided Hendricks, Kansas's Act
7. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 143 (Kan. 1996) (Larson, J., dissenting), rev'd
sub nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
8. See id. (Larson, J., dissenting).
9. See id. at 133 (considering U.S. CONST. amend. V (Due Process Clause); id. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 3 (Ex Post Facto Clause); id. amend. V (Double Jeopardy Clause)).
10. See id. at 138.
11. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
12. See id. at 2086.
13. See infra notes 22-120 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 121-220 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 221-51 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 252-340 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 260-95 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 295-332 and accompanying text.
19. The preamble of the Act states that "[t]he legislature finds that a small but
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who ... have anti-social
personality features ... [that] render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior."
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994); see also John Kip Cornwell, Protection and
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was the most comprehensive of the seventeen sexual predator
statutes in the nation because it, unlike the other statutes, both
applied retroactively and delayed treatment until after the offender
served his or her prison sentence ° Now that the Supreme Court has
approved this statutory scheme, twenty-five states are considering
passing similar sexually violent predator acts.21
In September 1994, Hendricks was scheduled for release to a
half-way house after serving nearly ten years for a 1984 indecent
liberties conviction.22 However, in accordance with the Act, the State
filed a petition before his release date seeking commitment. 3
Hendricks then appeared with counsel before a judge and moved to
dismiss the petition on constitutional grounds, but the court
concluded that probable cause existed to support a finding that he
was a sexually violent predator.2 4 Hendricks requested a jury trial to
determine if he qualified as a sexually violent predator and should be
committed According to the Act, a sexually violent predator is any
one "who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent
offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory
acts of sexual violence, if not confined in a secure facility."26 The jury
determined that Hendricks satisfied this definition based upon
Treatment" The Permissible Civil Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1293, 1294-96 (1996) (describing the different types of laws, including Megan's Law and
sexual predator acts, that states have passed to control sexual predators); Deborah L.
Morris, Note, Constitutional Implications of the Involuntary Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators-A Due Process Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 594, 595 (1997)
("Public outcry over ever increasing incidents of sexual violence encouraged a number of
state legislatures to enact laws requiring the involuntary commitment of sexual
predators."); Recent Legislation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 787, 787-92 (1995) (discussing
Washington's sex offender notification statute that authorizes "the use of 'modem day
scarlet letters'" (quoting Jon Brilliant, Note, The Modem Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical
Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1357)).
20. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2095 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Roxanne Lieb,
Washington's Sexual Violent Predator Law: Legislative History and Comparisons with
Other States (visited Feb. 22, 1998) <http://www.wa.gov/wsipp/reports/violpred.html>
(providing details about and a comparison of seven states with sexual violent predator
acts as of December 1996).
21. See 60 Minutes, supra note 1 (discussing the effect of the Court's decision in
Hendricks).
22. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078; infra note 27 (providing details of the
conviction).
23. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
24. See id. The judge reserved ruling on the Act's constitutionality. See id.
25. See id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (Supp. 1997) (providing for a
jury trial).
26. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a).
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evidence that during a thirty-year period he was convicted six times
for sexually abusing children.27 Also, two psychiatrists testified that
he suffered from personality disturbances and pedophilia. 28
27. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078. The cycle of abuse began in 1955 when he
exposed his genitals to two young girls. See id. He pled guilty to indecent exposure but
did not go to jail until 1957, when he served a brief time after being convicted of lewdness
with a young girl. See id. Starting in 1960, he served a two-year sentence for molesting
two young boys while working at a carnival. See id. Shortly after his release for this
offense, he was arrested for molesting a seven-year-old girl. See id. The State attempted
to treat his deviant behavior at a state psychiatric hospital, and he was released in 1965
after being declared "safe to be at large." Id. Hendricks was then imprisoned from 1967
until 1972 for performing oral sex on an eight-year-old girl and fondling an eleven-year-
old boy. See id. During this sentence, he refused to participate in an optional sex
offender treatment program. See id. His stepdaughter and stepson testified at
Hendricks's civil commitment hearing about his repeated sexual abuse of them that began
in 1972 when he was paroled from prison. See id. at 2079 n.2. He was not imprisoned
again until 1984 when he was convicted of taking indecent liberties with two 13-year-old
boys. See id. at 2078. Pursuant to a plea arrangement, he was sentenced to 5 to 20 years.
See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Kansas v. Hendricks,
117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). The State agreed to drop a third count of indecent liberties with a
child and opted not to request sentencing in accordance with the Habitual Criminal Act.
See id.
28. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079 n.2; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AW5'N,
DIAGNOsTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 527-28 (4th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter DSM-IV] (defining a pedophiliac as someone who is 16 years old or older,
who is attracted to children in the same age range but at least five years younger than
him, and who has "recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies" that involve sexual
activity with children who are generally under 13 years old). But see Brief of Amicus
Curiae, Washington State Psychiatric Ass'n in Support of Respondent at 17-18, Hendricks
(Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075) ("The DSM-IV describes no personality disorder which is
peculiar to sex offenders .... [Courts can expect efforts to invent such a personality
disorder merely by labeling a pattern of sex offenses as a personality disorder, which is
then diagnosed from this pattern of offenses.").
States have generally been left to define mental illness as they choose. See, e.g.,
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364-65 n.13 (1983) (stating that because diagnosis by
the psychiatric community is uncertain, the courts should defer to legislative judgment
about insanity definitions). Courts and commentators have noted that this departure
from clinical terms causes difficulties in diagnosing a defendant's mental condition and
predicting future dangerousness. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1985)
(explaining that while psychiatrists explain a diagnosis of a defendant in language that a
jury can understand, psychiatrists often disagree about definitions of mental illness and
predictions of dangerousness); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 978 (D.C. Cir.
1972) ("[P]sychiatrists and psychologists are called to adduce relevant information
concerning what may for convenience be referred to as the 'medical' component of the
responsibility issue. But the diffculty... is that the ... expert comes, by testimony given
in ... a non-medical construct ... , to express conclusions that ... embody ethical and
legal conclusions."); Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945)
(stating that psychiatrists can get confused when trying to "reconcile the therapeutic
standards of their own art with the moral judgment of the criminal law"); John Q.
La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the
Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 667 (1992); Robert
M. Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's Sexually Violent Predators
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Hendricks agreed that he was a pedophiliac and testified that when
he " 'get[s] stressed out,' he 'can't control the urge' to molest
children," that he knew his actions were harmful to children, but that
treatment would not be effective.29 The trial court held as a matter of
law that pedophilia qualifies as a "mental abnormality" under the
Act3 and ordered him to be committed at Lamed State Security
Hospital, where he would remain until either the Secretary of the
Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services ("the Secretary")
or the court determined that his "mental abnormality or personality
disorder ha[d] so changed that [he] is safe to be at large and will not
engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged."'31  Hendricks is
entitled to annual examinations, the results of which the Secretary
will forward to a judge, who, at a hearing, will determine if probable
cause exists to release him32  The Secretary also could authorize
Hendricks to petition the court for release if the Secretary
determines that the mental abnormality has changed so that
Hendricks is no longer dangerous.
Hendricks appealed his confinement in Lamed, alleging that the
Act violated the Due Process,34 Double Jeopardy,35 and Ex Post
Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 597, 600-04 (1992) (explaining that diagnosis can be
especially difficult with sex offenders because a variety of psychiatric symptoms have
been attributed to them).
29. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078-79 (quoting Hendricks's testimony during his civil
commitment hearing). Other defendants who may not be so forthright about their
propensity to re-offend may pose more of a problem for a state trying to prove the
defendant's dangerousness. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 109-10 (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the difficulty of diagnosis); Wettstein, supra note 28,
at 604-07 (detailing the difficulty psychiatrists have in predicting future dangerous
behavior). Hendricks said in a recent television interview that he did not want to
participate in treatment because he did not want to be forced to talk about himself and his
feelings; however, after three years in the treatment program, he said he was now a
different person and that he has decided to change. See 60 Minutes, supra note 1.
30. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079. Kansas defines "mental abnormality" for
purposes of the Act as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or
volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a
degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others." KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a02(b).
31. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 52-29a08.
32- See id. If probable cause does exist, then the court schedules a hearing in which
the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person's mental
abnormality or personality disorder remains so that the person is "likely to engage in acts
of sexual violence" if released. Id.
33. See id. § 52-29a10. The person also can petition the court without the Secretary's
approval, but if the court determines that such petition is frivolous, it may dismiss the
petition without a hearing. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 52-29all (1994); infra notes 116-20
and accompanying text (explaining the release procedure).
34. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
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Facto36 clauses of the U.S. Constitution.' The Kansas Supreme
Court determined that the Act violated Hendricks's substantive due
process rights.3 According to the court's interpretation of United
States Supreme Court precedent, due process forbids a state from
involuntarily committing someone absent a showing that the person
is "both mentally ill and dangerous."3 9 Although the Act demanded a
finding that Hendricks suffered from a mental abnormality or
antisocial personality, the Kansas court determined that such a
finding was not "equivalent to the constitutional standard of mental
illness."'  The majority then criticized the Washington Supreme
Court for upholding that state's sexually violent predator statute4a
and determining that a mental abnormality was the same as a mental
illness. 42 In dicta, the majority wrote that the State should not create
property, without due process of law.").
35. Id. ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; .... ).
36. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.").
37. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
38. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Kansas v.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
39. Id. at 133-34; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992) (explaining
that the Due Process Clause requires a state to prove mental illness and dangerousness
before an individual can be involuntarily committed); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 363-64 (1983) (holding that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes
the requisite findings of dangerousness and mental illness and thus permits involuntary
commitment); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 420 (1979) (describing a Texas statute
that required proof of mental illness and proof of whether hospitalization was required to
protect the individual and others).
40. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 137. The State's psychiatrist, Dr. Charles Befort,
testified that Hendricks was a pedophiliac, but that he did not suffer from a mental illness
or a personality disorder. See id. at 131. Nonetheless, Dr. Befort testified that Hendricks
should be committed because pedophilia was a mental abnormality under the Act. See id.
According to the Act, a mental abnormality is a "congenital or acquired condition" that
affects "the emotional or volitional capacity" and "predisposes the person to commit
sexually violent offenses in a degree" that makes the person "a menace to the health and
safety of others." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (Supp. 1997). In contrast, for
purposes of traditional civil commitment, a mentally ill person is someone who suffers
from "a severe mental disorder" requiring treatment, who cannot "make an informed
decision [about] treatment," and who "is likely to cause harm to self or others." Id. § 59-
29a02(h).
41. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 135 (referring to WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 71.09.010-.902 (West 1992)); see also In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) (holding
that Washington's sexual predator statute is constitutional). But see Young v. Weston,
898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (determining that Washington's sexual predator
statute is unconstitutional because it does not require mental illness).
42. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 135 ("Simply stated, mental illness means
whatever the Washington court says it means."). The Kansas court relied on Foucha, in
which the Court determined that antisocial personality is not the same as mental illness.
See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78.
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a new statute with its own interpretation of mental illness when it
already had an involuntary civil commitment statute that satisfied
due process.43 Allowing the State to put sexually violent predators in
their own category could lead to "the same reasoning [being] applied
to anyone who commits any designated offense and is labeled
'mentally abnormal' or suffering from an 'antisocial personality
disorder.' "I Furthermore, the Kansas majority concluded that even
though the Act mentions treatment for sexual predators, its
"overriding concern" is "the segregation of sexually violent offenders
from the public."4  Because the court struck the statute on due
process grounds, it did not consider Hendricks's ex post facto or
double jeopardy claims. 46
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Kansas Supreme
Court47 and held that under a substantive due process analysis,
Kansas's Act satisfied the two prerequisites for involuntary
commitment: mental illness and future dangerousness of the
defendant.48 The Court determined that the State had satisfied these
prerequisites by showing that the sexual offender's dangerousness
was linked to a mental abnormality, the combination of which made
it virtually impossible for him to control his actions.49 While the focal
point of due process protection is freedom from physical restraint,
the Court emphasized that this "liberty interest is not absolute."5
Involuntary commitment traditionally has overridden this freedom
because of the government's interest in protecting the public from
those who cannot control their actions.5 ' Because Kansas had
43. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2901 to
-2986 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (mandating the procedures and requirements for civil
commitment).
44. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136.
45. Id. This finding was an important factor for Justice Breyer in reaching the
conclusion that the Act was punitive. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2091-92 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
46. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138. The dissent examined these claims,
however, and rejected them. It first looked at the legislative intent and found the Act to
be civil, not criminal. See id. at 151-53 (Larson, J., dissenting). Because ex post facto and
double jeopardy protections usually apply only to criminal procedures, the dissent
concluded that Hendricks's claims had no basis. See id. at 153-54 (Larson, J., dissenting).
47. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the majority and was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct.
at 2076.
48. See id. at 2080.
49. See id. (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1993); Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364, 366 (1986); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 271-72
(1940)).
50. Id. at 2079 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
51. See id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) ("There are
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afforded proper procedures and evidentiary standards to offenders,5 2
the Court held, the Act did not violate due process. 3
The Court rejected Hendricks's contention that "mental
abnormality" was a term coined by the Kansas legislature and that it
failed to satisfy the due process requirement of mental illness.54 The
Court noted that it had used "a variety of expressions to describe the
mental condition of those properly subject to civil confinement" 55 and
that it traditionally allows state legislatures to define medical terms
with legal significance. 56 These definitions are often inconsistent with
medical definitions because the "legal" definitions also take into
account "'individual responsibility ... and competency.' 57 After
determining that the Act itself satisfied the Court's substantive due
process test, the Court then determined that Hendricks met the Act's
requirements for mental abnormality not only because he was
diagnosed as a pedophiliac but also because he admitted that he
manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.")).
In Jacobson, because the dangerousness to society outweighed the individual liberty
interest, the Court upheld a statute that allowed the State to use its police power to fine
or arrest people who refused to be vaccinated. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26-30. At least
one commentator has described the type of confinement in Jacobson as jurisprudence of
prevention. See Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled
Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 167-68 (1996)
(discussing the Jacobson decision). Jurisprudence of prevention can be contrasted with
therapeutic jurisprudence, a theory that supports the civil commitment of people who are
not punished for crimes they commit because they suffer from a mental illness that caused
them to commit the crime. See infra notes 260-63.
52. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a03 to -29all (1994 & Supp. 1997).
53. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079-80; see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (holding
unconstitutional a statute that allowed the state to continue holding someone found not
guilty by reason of insanity on the sole basis that he was dangerous, even though he no
longer suffered from a mental illness); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979)
(holding that the burden of proof on the State when civilly committing someone must be
greater than a preponderance of the evidence).
54. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080-81. In concurrence, Justice Kennedy cautioned
that the Court's precedents would not validate "mental abnormality" as a "solid basis" for
commitment if in the future it was shown to be "too imprecise a category." Id. at 2087
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 2080 (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88; Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26; Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,732 (1972)).
56. See id. at 2081 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 & n.13 (1983));
Andrew Hammel, Comment, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator Civil
Commitment Laws and the Idea of Sex Crimes As Insane Acts, 32 HOUs. L. REV. 775,798-
99 (1995) (explaining that the "Court's policy is to defer to legislative definitions of
mental disease" even though it has been willing to address other issues surrounding
commitment, such as procedural due process protections and the requisite burdens of
proof).
57. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081 (quoting DSM-IV, supra note 28, at xxiii, xxvii).
1980 [Vol. 76
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lacked the ability to control himself.58 This admission, "coupled with
a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguished
Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.
59
Next, the Court rejected Hendricks's argument that the Act
"establishe[d] criminal proceedings," thus making his confinement a
punishment.6° The first question for the majority was one of
statutory construction, which essentially entailed that the Court
determine whether the Kansas legislature intended the Act to be civil
or criminal.6' The legislature's intent was readily apparent to the
majority because the legislature not only placed the Act in the
probate code but also described the procedure as a civil
commitment.62 Because a civil label is not dispositive, the Court's
second consideration was whether Hendricks offered "'the clearest
proof'" that the Act was in fact punitive in purpose or effect.
63
Hendricks failed to meet this burden because he did not show that
the Act intended to serve the traditional goals of criminal
58. See id.; see also supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (detailing testimony at
Hendricks's trial). Professor Janus has argued that with the Court's decisions in
Addington and Foucha, the "jurisprudence of prevention is dead" because the Court has
made it clear that commitment can be predicated only on combined factors of mental
illness and dangerousness. Janus, supra note 51, at 185; see infra notes 132-50 and
accompanying text (discussing the holding in Addington); infra notes 172-220 (discussing
the holding in Foucha). But in Hendricks, the Court appeared to favor the jurisprudence
of prevention, which balances the threat of dangerousness against a person's liberty
interest without requiring mental illness, because the Court appeared to be using "mental
abnormality" as "window dressing." Janus, supra note 51, at 165.
59. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081. The dissent agreed with the outcome of the
majority's assessment of Hendricks's due process claim. See id. at 2088 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote for the dissent and was joined in his due process
analysis by Justices Stevens and Souter. See id. at 2087 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Ginsburg joined only in Parts II and III, which addressed only the ex post facto claim. See
id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Due process, according to Justice Breyer, allows Kansas to
deem Hendricks mentally ill and dangerous for civil commitment reasons. See id. at 2088
(Breyer, J., dissenting). He provided three reasons to support his conclusion. First,
psychiatrists recognize pedophilia as a "serious mental disorder" even if they do not label
it a mental illness. Id. (Breyer. J., dissenting). Second, this abnormality causes a lack of
volition to which Hendricks admitted and which the law recognizes as being "akin to
insanity for purposes of confinement." Id. at 2089 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Finally, this
mental abnormality makes Hendricks dangerous to children. See id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
60. Id. at 2081.
61. See id. at 2081-82; see also infra notes 225-51 and accompanying text (explaining
the Court's development of this test).
62. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
63. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)); see infra notes
234-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis in Ward).
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punishment-retribution and deterrence.' First, the Act was not
retributive because it did not punish past conduct, but rather it used
past conduct" 'to show the accused's mental condition and to predict
future behavior.' "65 Second, civil commitment under the Act could
not function as a deterrent because an essential component of the
personality abnormality as defined by the Act was the person's lack
of volitional control.66 Moreover, the Court determined that even
though the procedures in the statute mirrored some criminal
procedures, this fact in itself did not make the Act punitive.67
Similarly, the fact that someone is constrained does not "inexorably
lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed
punishment."'  Confining the mentally ill has long been considered a
legitimate non-punitive government objective.69
However, Hendricks tried to show that the civil commitment was
punitive for two key reasons: the period of commitment was
indefinite, and the State never intended to provide offenders with
treatment.70 The Court rejected Hendricks's first contention on the
grounds that his confinement was "only potentially indefinite '71
because the Act provided that the State intended to confine the
offender only as long as he suffered from the mental abnormality that
64. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
65. Id. (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371 (1986)). Retribution in criminal
law is based upon the idea that every crime requires payment in the form of punishment.
See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990); see also WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAw § 2 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 15th ed. 1993) (stating that state punishment has replaced
private revenge and that by denouncing crime society is promoting lawfulness).
Confinement under the Act is not punishment in payment for a crime because the illegal
act by the sex offender is merely used in the diagnosis of his condition and to predict if he
will commit the act again. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082. If the offender is not found
to suffer from a mental condition and also is determined not to be a threat to public
safety, then he will be released. See id. If the civil commitment was retributive (served as
payment for the criminal action), then all sex offenders would be civilly committed at the
end of their prison sentence. See id.
66. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
67. See id. This same argument was rejected by the Court in Allen v. Illinois, in which
the Court stated that "to provide some of the safeguards applicable in criminal trials
cannot itself turn these proceedings into criminal prosecutions." Allen, 478 U.S. at 372
(evaluating Illinois's Sexually Dangerous Person Act that allowed the commitment of
offenders in lieu of treatment); infra notes 244-51 and accompanying text (discussing the
facts and holding in Allen).
68. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746
(1987)); see infra notes 200-07 and accompanying text (discussing Salerno).
69. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083 (citing Salerno, 482 U.S. at 747).
70. See id.; Reply Brief for Cross Petitioner at 8, 18, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-
9075).
71. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083.
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makes him dangerous.7z The Court rejected his second argument
regarding treatment because it determined that incapacitation can be
a legitimate end to a civil statute, especially if no treatment is
available.73 The majority stated that Hendricks mistakenly presumed
that treatment was available for pedophilia.74 Nevertheless, even if
his presumption was correct and treatment was available, the Court
determined that making treatment a secondary concern did not make
the Act unconstitutional. 75 Finally, because Hendricks was the first
offender committed under the Act, the Court determined that the
State should be allowed some time to develop its treatment
program.7 6
Because the Court determined that the Act was not punitive, it
rejected Hendricks's claims of double jeopardy and ex post facto
violations.7 7 The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a state from
punishing a person twice for the same offense.78 In determining that
civil commitment did not constitute punishment, the majority first
relied upon Baxstrom v. Herold,79 in which the Court concluded that
civil commitment can follow a prison term so long as the prisoner's
case was reviewed in the same manner as those of all others who
72. See id.; see also infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (explaining the
different avenues by which the offender can be released).
73. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49; Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986)); see also infra notes 200-07 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's decision in Salerno); infra notes 244-51 (discussing the Court's
holding in Allen). Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975), emphasized that even though some forms of mental illness are not
treatable, the State may still confine someone as long as that person is still mentally ill
and dangerous. See id. at 584 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
74. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083. The Court pointed out that the Kansas
Supreme Court also rejected this assumption and dismissed treatment under the Act as
being merely incidental. See id. at 2083-84 (citing In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136,
rev'd sub nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997)). See generally Wettstein,
supra note 28, at 614-22 (explaining problems involved with treatment of sex offenders,
from cost of the programs to delays in treatment to whether coerced treatment really
works); Laurie J. Scott, Can Offenders Reform?, KAN. CITY STAR, Aug. 6, 1993, at C3
(discussing the merits and limitations of sex offender programs in prisons in Kansas and
Missouri).
75. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084.
76. See id. at 2085 nn.4-5 (explaining that the Court has given states "wide latitude"
in developing treatment programs). At oral argument, the State said it was now providing
Hendricks and others committed under the Act with 31.5 hours of treatment. See id. at
2085; Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-16, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075), available
in 1996 WL 721073.
77. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085.
78. See id. (relying on Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389,396 (1995)).
79. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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were civilly committed."0 In the alternative, Hendricks claimed that
the State violated double jeopardy under the "same elements" test by
punishing one act-taking indecent liberties with a child-two
separate times because the act violated two separate statutes, both
the criminal statute and the Act." The same elements test considers
whether each statute requires different proofs of fact; if not, then
double jeopardy is violated.8 The Court rejected this theory because
the Act used Hendricks's criminal offense only for evidentiary
purposes, not as grounds for punishment under the Act.83 Also, the
Court found that the same elements test did "not apply outside of the
successive prosecution context."'  In addressing Hendricks's final
argument, the Court stated that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits
punishing a person with additional punitive measures for a crime
committed before the enactment of these measures. 85 The majority
determined not only that the Act was not penal, but also that the Act
did not criminalize past conduct because it evaluated the person's
current mental state. 6
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the Act was punitive, and
thus in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, for several reasons.87
First, the basic objective of the Act was incapacitation, which has
long been recognized as an important purpose of criminal
punishment.8  Second, the dissent emphasized the majority's
recognition and the Court's precedent that a civil label is not always
dispositive and also noted the various criminal procedures adopted
80. See id. at 115; infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text (discussing the
significance of Baxstrom).
81. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086; see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932) (holding that double jeopardy is not violated as long as the offenses with
which the defendant is charged each require proof of different elements).
82 See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
83. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
84. Id.
85. See id. (citing California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505
(1995)).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent did not argue that the Act
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Instead, it argued that using the Act to civilly
commit Hendricks violated the Court's holding in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386
(1798), by imposing a punishment on Hendricks that was greater than what was available
in 1984 when he pled guilty to and was sentenced for taking indecent liberties. See
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at
390 (holding that a law inflicting greater punishment than was available when the crime
was committed violates the Ex Post Facto Clause).
88. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (relying on Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 99 (1992), United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965), and 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMmENTARins *11-*12).
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by the Act that make it appear punitive.89 Third, the dissent pointed
to factors that indicate the punitive nature of the Act.90 These factors
included whether treatment was provided, and if provided, whether it
was delayed;91 the state court's findings as to the purpose of the
underlying state action;92 whether any less restrictive alternative
treatment is provided for in the Act;93 and provisions in similar
statutes in other states. 4 Treatment was an important concern for
Justice Breyer because a reasonable person expects the State, when it
confines someone for a personality disorder, to help that person
"overcome that abnormality."95 Finally, in addition to those features,
Justice Breyer evaluated the Act in light of the following seven
factors delineated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez:96  (1) whether
the sanction involves "affirmative disability or restraint;" (2)
"whether it has historically been regarded as punishment;" (3)
"whether [the penalty] comes into play only [after] a finding of
scienter;" (4) whether the operation of the penalty promotes
89. See id. at 2091 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 777 (1994) (recognizing that civil and criminal labels are not of
paramount importance).
90. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2091 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135,2142 (1996)).
91. See id. at 2091-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 244-51 and
accompanying text (discussing Allen v. Illinois, 438 U.S. 364 (1986), in which the Court
placed great significance on the treatment component of Illinois's Sexually Dangerous
Person Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 205/3 (West 1993)). Delay in treatment is a
significant point in deciding if the Kansas legislature really intended to treat sexual
offenders or if it was using treatment as a "sham," because the legislature recognized in
the preamble of the Act that long-term treatment was better than treatment in prison.
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994). In concurrence, Justice Kennedy said if a state
used treatment only as "a sham or mere pretext, there would ... [be] an indication of the
forbidden purpose to punish." Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2092-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra notes
34-46 and accompanying text (discussing the lower court's ruling). Justice Breyer
contrasted the Kansas Supreme Court decision with that of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Allen in which Illinois clearly intended treatment to be the goal of its Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act because it committed the offender in the beginning instead of sending him to
jail. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Allen, 478 U.S. at 370
(quoting People v. Allen, 481 N.E.2d 690, 692 (1985))).
93. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2094-95 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 2095 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer compared the Act to other
statutes in effect at that time and found that Kansas, by following other states, could have
structured the Act without punitive features. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). For
instance, seven states "require consideration of less restrictive alternatives to
commitment," and 10 states provide treatment to offenders soon after they are charged.
See id. at 2095, app. at 2099 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). For a discussion of Mendoza-Martinez, see infra notes 229-
33 and accompanying text.
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retribution or deterrence; (5) "whether the behavior to which [the
penalty] applies is already a crime;" (6) whether an alternative
purpose is assignable for the penalty; and (7) whether the penalty is
"excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned." 97 After
applying these factors to Hendricks's case, Justice Breyer argued that
each of them weighed in favor of finding the Act to be punitive.8
Justice Breyer confined the dissent to Hendricks's situation alone by
listing types of statutes and state actions that would not offend the Ex
Post Facto Clause.99 His examples included statutes similar to the
Act that were applied only prospectively; the imposition of
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences; the lengthening of
sentences through recidivism statutes; and retroactive statutes that
did not impose a later punishment on top of an earlier one.110 Thus,
while the dissent found the Act to be unconstitutional in its
application against Hendricks, it stated that it would approve other
statutes as long as they made certain that the commitment of such
offenders could not be construed as punishment.101
Kansas passed the Sexually Violent Predator Act in 1994 in
response to public outrage against the rape and murder of Stephanie
Schmidt by a repeat sex offender."° Sixteen other states had sexual
97. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. at 168-69).
98. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer said that the Mendoza-Martinez
factors were merely helpful but not dispositive in evaluating a sanction as punitive or civil.
See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). He did not detail his use of these factors but rather said
each one balances "in favor of a constitutional characterization [of the Act] as
'punishment.'" Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). While Justice Breyer revealed the types of
statutes he would likely uphold in the future, in a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy
made it clear that, even though he joined the majority in full, he would be willing to strike
down any civil acts in the future that use incapacitation to further the goals of either
retribution or general deterrence or ones that define mental abnormality too imprecisely.
See id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Along with the majority, Justice Kennedy
determined that Kansas's Act was not retributive or deterrent, and he accepted Kansas's
definition of mental abnormality because the definition distinguished Hendricks and
other sexual predators from dangerous people who may commit crimes, but do not suffer
from such an abnormality. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority's evaluation of the Act).
102. See McCaffrey, supra note 1, at 887-88. The Task Force on Sex Offenders was
formed and lobbied the legislature to pass a package of sex offender laws. See id.; see also
Sullinger, supra note 2, at Cl (detailing the efforts of two Kansas lawmakers to propose a
bill on behalf of the Task Force). Members on the Task Force included Stephanie's
parents and representatives of the legislature, law enforcement, the legal community, and
the community at large. See McCaffrey, supra note 1, at 887-88.
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predator statutes at that time, 3 and Kansas chose to model its
version on Washington's sexual predator law." 4 In the Act's
preamble, the Kansas legislature stated that the purpose of the Act
was to provide long-term care and treatment for sex offenders who
suffered from an antisocial disorder that was "unamenable to existing
mental illness treatment modalities" and that made them likely to
reoffend. 05 These offenders were a small but dangerous group who
needed long-term care because their chances of rehabilitation in a
prison setting were poor;0 6 however, under the Act, the treatment for
these offenders was delayed until after they served prison time, if
they were convicted of a sexually violent offense. 1' 7
103. The other states with similar statutes were Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct.
app. at 2099 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing the sexual offense commitment statutes in
effect at the time of Hendricks); Lieb, supra note 20 (detailing the requirements of the
sexual predator statutes in effect as of February 1998). State and federal courts in
Washington have ruled on Washington's sexually violent predator statute, with the state
court upholding the statutes as constitutional, but the federal court ruling that a
personality disorder is not the same as a mental illness. Compare In re Young, 857 P.2d
989, 992 (Wash. 1993) (finding Washington's statute constitutional), with Young v.
Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 754 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (finding Washington's sexual predator
statute unconstitutional because it does not require the defendant to be mentally ill). For
a discussion of the confusion among lower courts when evaluating sexual predator law,
see Cornwell, supra note 19, at 1312-13.
104. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Kansas v.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (noting that Kansas modeled its statute after
Washington's sexual predator statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.902 (West
1992)). Washington passed its statute in response to the rape, murder, and sexual
mutilation of a seven-year-old boy. See Morris, supra note 19, at 611.
105. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994). The Kansas statute mirrors Washington's
sexual offenders act in almost every section. See WAkSH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010 -
.902.
106. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01.
107. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (Supp. 1997). The offenses that the state
defined as sexually violent include (but are not limited to) rape, indecent liberties with a
child, criminal sodomy, indecent solicitation of a child, sexual exploitation of a child, and
aggravated sexual battery, as well as an attempt, conspiracy, or criminal solicitation of a
sexually violent offense or any act that at the time of sentencing or civil commitment is
determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated. See id. § 59-
29a02(e) (1995).
Of the 17 states that have sex offender statutes, eight follow the same procedure as
Kansas and commit the offenders after they have served their sentences. The other states
substitute treatment for incarceration. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185 (West
Supp. 1997-98) (delaying treatment until after the offender has been incarcerated), and
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.06 (West Supp. 1997) (delaying treatment until the offender has
served prison time), with COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-11.7-105 (West Supp. 1997)
(requiring all sexual predators sentenced or placed on probation after January 1, 1994, to
undergo treatment while in prison or as part of probation), and 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 205/3 (West 1993) (implementing the treatment program in lieu of prison time).
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Under the Act, the commitment process begins when the
agency08 that has custody of a sex offender notifies the attorney
general of a pending release ninety days before such release is to
occur, if the agency thinks the offender meets the criteria of a
sexually violent predator as defined in the Act.10 9 The attorney
general, assisted by a prosecutor's review team, is responsible for
deciding if probable cause exists that the person in question satisfies
the Act's conditions of mental abnormality and future dangerousness
and should be civilly committed."0 The offender then proceeds
through several hearings to determine his status as a sex offender
under the Act, including a probable cause hearing before a judge, 1'
followed by a trial, if probable cause is found. This trial resembles
a criminal proceeding, as the alleged sex offender is entitled to
assistance by counsel, a court-appointed attorney if the offender is
indigent, examination by experts to determine the offender's mental
state, and a jury trial."' At trial, the attorney general has the burden
of convincing the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the
person is a sexually violent offender."4 If such a determination is
made, then the offender is turned over to the custody of the Secretary
of Social and Rehabilitation Services for control and care until his
condition changes to the extent that he is safe to enter society."5
The offender will not be released until it is determined by either
the Secretary or by the court that his "mental abnormality or
personality disorder has so changed that [he] is safe to be at large and
will not engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged.""16 Offenders
are entitled to annual examinations, the results of which the
The Act applies not only to offenders who are convicted of a sexually violent offense,
but also to other offenders who are charged with such offenses but found incompetent to
stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a) (Supp.
1997).
108. An agency with jurisdiction over an offender "serving a sentence or term of
confinement" for an offense covered by the Act can include the corrections department,
the parole board, and the department of social and rehabilitation services. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(f).
109. See id. § 59-29a03.
110. See id. § 59-29a03(e).
111. See id. § 59-29a05(a).
112. See id. § 59-29a06.
113. See id. The State may also be required to pay for the examination of the offender
by an expert who will testify on the offender's behalf if the offender is indigent. See id. If
the offender, the attorney general, and the judge all fail to request a jury, then the trial
will be before a judge. See id.
114. See id. § 59-29a07(a). A jury verdict must be unanimous. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. § 59-29a08.
1988 [Vol. 76
STATE CIVIL COMMITMENT POWER
Secretary can forward to a judge who may hold a hearing to
determine if probable cause exists to release the sex offender."7 If
probable cause exists, then the state has the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the sex offender's mental
abnormality or personality disorder remains.1 Alternatively, the
Secretary can authorize the sex offender to petition the court for
release if the Secretary determines that the offender's mental
abnormality has so changed that he is not likely to "commit
predatory acts of sexual violence if released."" 9 The sex offender can
petition the court without the Secretary's approval, but in such a case
the court may decide that the petition is frivolous and dismiss it
without a hearing. 20
In enacting its Sexually Violent Predator Act, Kansas did not
develop a new model for dealing with sex offenders. In fact, statutes
calling for the civil commitment of sexual deviants have been in
existence for decades as the states have struggled to deal with what is
considered to be a particularly dangerous class of offenders.' In
1940, the Supreme Court upheld such a statute in Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court. 12 Chapter 369 of the Minnesota statutes
allowed for the commitment of people with a psychopathic
personality, which was defined as the presence of conditions such as
"'emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of
customary standards of good judgment'" to the extent that a person
is not responsible "'for his conduct with respect to sexual matters
and thereby dangerous to other persons.' ,,s The Court relied upon
the state court's finding that the statute did not apply to sexual
offenders as a whole, but only to those who showed habitual deviant
conduct and a complete lack of ability to control themselves and
therefore were likely to harm someone again.124 Thus, proof of
habitual deviant conduct satisfied the requirements of due process by
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id. § 52-29a10.
120. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 52-29all (1994).
121. See LINDA SLEFFEL, THE LAW AND THE DANGEROUS CRIMINAL 41-43 (1977)
(explaining the theory and purposes of sexual psychopath statutes). Sleffel asserts that
sexual psychopath statutes were passed in "two waves." Id. at 43. The first wave of
statutes, in the 1900s, did not emphasize sex crimes as modem statutes do, but instead
they targeted" 'mental defectives'" and the" 'feeble-minded.'" Id. The second wave of
statutes, in the 1930s, emphasized providing treatment for sexual psychopaths. See id.
122. 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
123. Id. at 272 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 369-1 (1939)).
124. See id. at 273.
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preventing the statute from being too vague and indefinite.'25 In
regard to the general applicability of sexual psychopathic statutes, the
Court concluded that even though a danger existed that the class of
people subject to the statutes could have their basic liberties violated
by abuses in administration or by the courts, such statutes "are not
patently defective in any vital respect and we should not assume, in
advance of a decision by the state court, that they should be
construed so as to deprive appellant of the due process to which he is
entitled under the Federal Constitution.' 1 26
A subsequent line of cases addressed further concerns about
state infringement on the liberty of those involuntarily committed.
For instance, Baxstrom v. Herold27 concerned a prisoner who was
certified insane by a prison doctor while serving a sentence for
second-degree assault.' When Baxstrom's prison sentence was
about to expire, the director of the state hospital filed a petition for
his commitment. 129 Baxstrom was moved from the care of the
department of corrections to the department of mental hygiene at the
expiration of his sentence, but he was still detained in a hospital used
to confine male prisoners, rather than being transferred to a civil
hospital.3 0 Here, the Court held that the state denied Baxstrom
equal protection by treating him differently than others who were
civilly committed in New York because he was not given the
opportunity for a review by a jury and he was confined at the prison
hospital without a determination that he was "dangerously mentally
iU."131
125. See id. at 274. The Court also upheld the statute on equal protection grounds, as
it determined that the legislature had the authority "to recognize degrees of harm, and it
may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need was deemed to be
clearest." Id. at 275.
126. Id. at 277. Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathy Personality Statute was challenged
again in the 1990s in In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994), and the Minnesota
Supreme Court found the statute to be constitutional under the Due Process Clause
because the court determined that psychopathic personality was an identifiable disorder.
See id. at 914. For a recounting of the constitutional challenges to Minnesota's statute
from Pearson to Blodgett, see Katherine P. Blakey, Student Article, The Indefinite
Commitment of Dangerous Sex Offenders Is an Appropriate Legal Compromise Between
"Mad" and "Bad"--A Study of Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute, 10
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 227,237-42 (1996).
127. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
128. See id. at 108.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 109.
131. Id. at 110. An equal protection claim was not raised in Hendricks, but the Court
included Baxstrom in its foundation of precedent because the Baxstrom Court did not find
the commitment of a prisoner after his prison term was served to be unconstitutional. See
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086; supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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More than ten years passed until the next landmark civil
commitment case-Addington v. Texas.'32 In Addington, the Court
held that due process imposes upon the state a burden of proof of at
least clear and convincing evidence in civil commitment hearings. 33
At the request of Addington's mother, Texas civilly committed
Addington for an indefinite period after he was arrested for
threatening her."M Addington challenged the burden of proof placed
on the State and argued that procedural due process required the
State to have the same burden of proof in civil commitment hearings
as it had in criminal proceedings-beyond a reasonable doubt.135 The
jury in Addington's civil commitment hearing was instructed that it
only had to be convinced by clear and convincing evidence that he
was mentally ill and that he required hospitalization for the
protection of himself and others. 36 While the ultimate question
presented to the Court concerned procedural due process, the Court
still had to examine the substantive issues because "civil commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that
requires due process protection.' 13 7  The Court determined that
under its parens patriae power, a state has a legitimate interest in
caring for people who cannot care for themselves because of
emotional disorders.3 In dicta, the Court stated that because an
individual's liberty is at stake, the State must show that the disability
upon which commitment is predicated is more than "idiosyncratic
behavior."'3 9 In addition to this parens patriae power, the State also
has the authority through its police power to involuntarily confine
those who pose a danger to themselves or others. 4 Thus, when
someone with a mental illness can no longer care for himself and
132. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
133. See id at 433.
134. See id. at 420. During the previous six years, Addington had been involuntarily
committed seven times. See id.
135. See id. at 421-22.
136. See id. at 421.
137. Id. at 425 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967)).
Once the basis for the commitment passes the substantive due process test, the
government interest can be implemented only in a fair manner. See, e.g., United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,747 (1987) (holding that the pretrial detainment of a defendant did
not violate due process because his confinement was not for an indefinite amount of
time).
138. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426; Morris, supra note 19, at 624-28. "Parens patriae"
literally means "parent of the country" and refers to the State's serving as guardian of
persons under a legal disability. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
139. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
140. See id. at 426.
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poses a threat to himself or others, the State does not violate his
substantive due process rights by committing the individual pursuant
to its parens patriae and police powers. 141
While the State has the ability to commit these individuals, due
process requires a high standard of procedural protections in order to
guard against error. 42 A preponderance of the evidence standard not
only increases the risk of error but also does not appear to further the
State's interest in committing these dangerous, emotionally unstable
people.43 While preponderance of the evidence is too low a
threshold, the Court held that a beyond a reasonable doubt standard
would be inappropriate for civil commitment hearings.144  Even
though distinguishing between the different standards of proof could
be difficult, the Court held that the lowest burden of proof a state
could require is the intermediate standard of clear and convincing
evidence because it "'reflects the value society places on individual
liberty.' "145 Because "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection," 14 a higher burden of proof impresses upon the factfinder
the importance of his conclusion and possibly reduces the chance of
error.47 The Court refused nonetheless to force the states to adopt
the highest standard of proof for civil commitments because
determining whether one is mentally ill and dangerous hinges upon
interpretation of the facts by expert psychiatrists and psychologists. 148
Because psychiatric diagnosis lacks certainty, the Court doubted
whether a state could ever demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt
141. See id. at 425-27 (balancing individual liberty interest with the State's interest in
protecting people from those who cannot control their behavior); see also Janus, supra
note 51, at 170-72 (explaining the Court's decision in Addington as planting the "seeds of
rejection" regarding the jurisprudence of prevention); infra notes 260-63 and
accompanying text (discussing Janus's ideas of jurisprudence of prevention and
therapeutic jurisprudence).
142. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 432-33.
145. Id. at 425 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971)). The
Court did not preclude a state from adopting a beyond a reasonable doubt standard for
civil commitments, even though the Court considered that standard to be too difficult for
a state to satisfy in a civil commitment hearing. See id. at 432-33.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 427. A procedural due process question was not even raised in
Hendricks, perhaps because Kansas's Sexually Violent Predators Act is in line with
Addington in that it requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a
sexually violent predator. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (Supp. 1997); supra notes
108-20 and accompanying text (explaining procedural protections in the Act).
148. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 429. States can, however, choose to use a higher
burden. See id. at 431.
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that a person was both mentally ill and dangerous.14 9 Instead, the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard was reserved for criminal cases
to avoid the temptation of applying it "too broadly or casually." 150
Jones v. United States' clarified how the standards established
in Addington applied to a criminal defendant found not guilty by
reason of insanity. Jones was committed to a mental hospital after
being acquitted by reason of insanity for attempting to shoplift a
jacket from a department store.5 2 After Jones had been in a mental
hospital for fifty days, the trial court held a hearing in which it
determined, based upon testimony by hospital staff, that Jones still
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and that he posed a danger to
himself and othersY.3 He was returned to the mental hospital and did
not have another hearing until nine months later. 54 By this time, he
had been committed for more than the maximum time he could have
served in prison if he had been convicted of the shoplifting charge. 5
Therefore, he demanded that he be released unconditionally or that
the State commit him pursuant to civil commitment standards,
including a jury trial and a burden of proof of clear and convincing
evidence.55 In his appeal of the trial court's decision not to release
him, he contended that his shoplifting trial was not constitutionally
adequate to justify his resulting commitment for an indefinite amount
of time. 57 He was found not guilty by reason of insanity by only a
preponderance of the evidence, a standard that the Court in
Addington had held was too low for civil commitment.' Automatic
commitment for an acquittal such as his could only be justified, Jones
argued, "for a period equal to the maximum prison sentence the
acquittee could have received if convicted.' 159 Otherwise, the length
149. See id. at 429. See generally Wettstein, supra note 28, "at 600 (describing the
difficulty psychiatrists have in trying to fit their diagnoses of patients within either
overinclusive or underinclusive legal definitions of mental illness).
150. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428.
151. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
152 See id. at 359-60.




157. See id. at 362.
158. See id.; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,427 (1979).
159. Jones, 463 U.S. at 362-63. The Court stated that a not guilty by reason of insanity
verdict determines that the defendant committed a criminal act and that he committed it
because of a mental illness. See id. at 363. According to Congress, these two findings
justify committing the acquittee as dangerous and mentally ill. See H.R. REP. No. 91-907,
at 73-74 (1970); S. REP. No. 84-1170, at 13 (1955). The traditional approach to criminal
and civil jurisprudence places defendants in one of two categories that commentators
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of his commitment would become indefinite, thereby triggering the
due process requirement of a higher burden of proof as determined
in Addington.160
The Supreme Court rejected Jones's argument by first
determining that a finding of insanity at the criminal trial established
that he committed a crime because of a mental illness, a finding that
was 'sufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness to
justify commitment" pursuant to the state's police power.161 Jones
argued that scientific evidence did not support the contention that
prior dangerousness is a valid measure of future dangerousness;162
however, the Court stated that the uncertainty of psychiatric
diagnosis was the precise reason that courts are compelled to "pay
particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments" about the
relationship between mental illness and dangerousness.6 3
Next, the Court rejected Jones's contention that committing him
indefinitely was unconstitutional, because the Court determined that
the concern about error against which the higher burden in
Addington was intended to protect was not present in Jones's case.164
In contrast to Addington, whose sanity was challenged by the State,
Jones asserted his insanity as an affirmative defense.'61 The Court
decided the chance of error was greater in Addington's case because
others were declaring him incompetent and what they might perceive
as abnormal could actually be only idiosyncratic behavior that was
outside the range of a mental disorder.166 Because those seeking
commitment could be wrong, the Court decided it would be improper
have referred to as "mad," which means they are not punished or held criminally
responsible for their crimes, or "bad," which means they will be punished. See, e.g., Carol
S. Steiker, Foreword.- Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-
Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEo. L.J. 775,784 (1997); Blakey, supra note 126, at 228-29.
160. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 363.
161. Id. at 363-64. Even though the defendant was absolved of responsibility for the
criminal act because of mental illness, the commission of the act justified commitment
because it indicated that he was dangerous. See id. at 364; see also Lynch v. Overholser,
369 U.S. 705, 714 (1962) (stating that once the State proves a defendant committed a
crime, the offense is "strong evidence" that the defendant "could imperil 'the
preservation of public peace' ").
162. In his reply brief, Jones pointed to the lack of empirical evidence underlying
Congress's enactment of its statutory scheme and the unavailability of research
supporting it. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 364 n.13 (citing Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13-14,
Jones (No. 81-5195)).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 366-67.
165. See id. at 356.
166. See id. at 367.
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to ask Addington to" 'share equally.., the risk of error.' "167 On the
other hand, Jones himself "advance[d] insanity as a defense," so the
Court concluded that the risk of error regarding his mental condition
was diminished."6
Finally, the fact that Jones had been committed longer than the
time he would have served in prison if he had been found guilty of
shoplifting was not a constitutional violation because due process
"'requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.' "169 Therefore, because the purpose of committing an
insanity acquittee is to provide him with treatment, it is reasonable to
hold him until he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous.17 This time
period can be indefinite because no one knows how long it will take
the defendant to respond to treatment.'7 '
In Foucha v. Louisiana,' the Court held that once a defendant
responds to treatment and the mental illness goes into remission, due
process requires the State to release that person, even if he is
considered still dangerous. 73 Foucha was charged with aggravated
burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm, but the testimony of
medical doctors supported his insanity plea. 4 Therefore, he was
found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to East
Feliciana Forensic Facility in October of 1984. s In 1988, the
superintendent at East Feliciana, as well as a three-member panel,
recommended that Foucha be discharged.' The same two doctors
who examined him in 1984 testified that they could not certify that he
would not be a threat to himself or others if released, even though his
mental illness was in remission.77 They diagnosed Foucha as
suffering from "an antisocial personality, a condition that is not a
mental disease and that is untreatable."''7 He was returned to East
Feliciana, and the state courts rejected his appeals. 7 9
167. Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,427 (1979)).
168. See id.
169. Id. at 368 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
173. See id. at 77.
174. See id. at 73-74.
175. See id. at 74.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 74-75.
178. Id. at 75.
179. See id. The state supreme court held that he had not met the burden required by
the statute proving that he was not dangerous, that Jones v. United States did not require
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The Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four decision. 80 The
Court first looked to Addington, which held that the Due Process
Clause required two statutory preconditions to commitment: mental
illness and threat of danger to oneself and others proven by at least
clear and convincing evidence. '81 In Jones, the Court had determined
that the State can commit defendants found not guilty by reason of
insanity without meeting this burden of proof because the inference
of the defendant's threat to the community arises from the
commission of a crime. 82 Like Jones, Foucha was not held
responsible for his crime or punished because he had shown by a
preponderance of evidence that he committed the crime incident to a
mental illness. 8' Such a defendant can be released when he is either
sane or no longer dangerous.'84  In other words, the Court
determined that if due process requires both conditions to exist in
order to commit the defendant involuntarily and indefinitely, due
process also requires the State to release him when at least one of
these conditions is no longer present.85 Based upon the Court's
holdings in Addington and Jones, the State no longer had a reason for
confining Foucha because his mental illness was in remission.186
The State argued that Foucha should remain committed because
his antisocial personality, combined with his occasional violent
conduct at East Feliciana, showed that he was dangerous either to
himself or others. The majority, however, rejected this argument on
two grounds. 187 First, the State could not continue to hold him
without a determination in a civil commitment hearing that he was
mentally ill and dangerous.'8 The psychiatrists testified that he had
an antisocial personality, but the Court did not equate this condition
his release, and that neither due process nor equal protection was violated by the statute,
which allowed confinement "based on dangerousness alone." Id. According to the
Louisiana statute governing commitment proceedings, in deciding whether to release an
insanity acquittee, a judge is to consider whether that person is a danger to himself or
others. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 654 (West 1981). The statute makes no
reference to the defendant's mental condition. See id.
180. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 72.
181. See id. at 75-76; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426-27 (1979).
182. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76; Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,363-64 (1983).
183. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76.
184. See id. at 77.
185. See id.; Janus, supra note 51, at 174-77 (arguing that with its decision in Foucha,
the Court completely rejected the jurisprudence of prevention); infra notes 260-63 and
accompanying text (discussing Professor Janus's concepts of the jurisprudence of
prevention and therapeutic jurisprudence).
186. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 78-79.
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with mental illness.18 9 A convicted felon still has a liberty interest
that prevents the state from transferring him to a mental institution
without following constitutionally prescribed procedures, because his
commitment must bear a relationship to the purpose for which he is
being committed.90 Thus, if his mental illness is in remission, then
the purpose for which he was committed no longer exists. 19'
Second, the Court held that due process has a substantive
component that prohibits "'arbitrary, wrongful government actions
regardless of fairness of the procedures used to implement them.' ",92
The Court stated that it had long recognized that freedom from
restraint is a core interest and that such a freedom should not be
minimized.Y While the State's police power does allow confinement
for either the purpose of retribution or deterrence, the State is
limited in what acts it can criminalize. 94 For instance, a jury absolved
Foucha of responsibility for his crime by finding him not guilty by
reason of insanity; therefore, he cannot be punished. 9 5 Thus, in
Foucha the Court determined that it had been careful not to
"minimize the importance and fundamental nature" of individual
liberty even when the individual is an insanity acquittee or a
convicted felon.'9 6 Furthermore, the Due Process Clause bars
"arbitrary, wrongful government actions," even if the actions are
procedurally fair, because freedom from bodily restraint is a core
interest.Y7 The Court held that confining Foucha after his mental
illness had gone into remission would be a wrongful intrusion on his
core interests.'
The Foucha majority did point out that in very narrow
circumstances it had allowed "limited confinement" based on the
offender's dangerousness alone.199 For instance, in United States v.
Salerno,00 the Court held that the Bail Reform Act20' did not violate
189. See id. at 79.
190. See id.
191. See id.






198. See id. at 77.
199. See id. at 80.
200. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. V 1987) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156
(1994)). The Bail Reform Act authorizes a court to hold someone without bail while
awaiting trial if the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that "no release
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due process for two reasons, even though pretrial confinement of the
defendant was predicated on dangerousness alone.2" First, the Court
noted that the government had the general compelling interest of
preventing crime and protecting the safety of others. 3 The Court
held that the Bail Reform Act furthered this goal and was narrowly
tailored to reach a small class of people who commit very violent
crimes, such as those that carry a sentence of life imprisonment or
death,2' and whose dangerousness the State must prove by clear and
convincing evidence.205 The Court stated that in similar situations it
has "repeatedly held that the Government's regulatory interest in
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an
individual's liberty interest."2 6 Second, the Bail Reform Act did not
violate due process because the duration of confinement under it was
limited to the period of time before the defendant's trial began.0 7
In Foucha, however, the Court determined that the State did not
have a "particularly convincing reason" to continue holding Foucha,
and that by holding him, it was infringing upon his "fundamental
right" to "freedom from physical restraint. ' 28  The Foucha majority
held that dangerousness was "not enough to defeat Foucha's liberty
interest under the Constitution in being freed from indefinite
confinement in a mental facility. '29 In fact, it warned that allowing
confinement based on dangerousness alone would grant the State
license to hold indefinitely not only people acquitted by reason of
conditions 'will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person of the community.'"
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)).
202. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-52; see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80-81 (explaining that
Salerno is a narrow circumstance in which a defendant is detained based on
dangerousness alone).
203. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
204. See id. at 747.
205. See id. The Court also relied on a finding by Congress that people who commit
the crimes specified in the Bail Reform Act are more likely to be dangerous. See id.
(relying on S. REP. No. 98-225, at 6-7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3188-
90).
206. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748. Still, the Court recognized that "[iun our society liberty
is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception."
Id. at 755.
207. See id. at 748.
208. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992).
209. Id. at 82. By rejecting the State's contention that Foucha's antisocial personality
justified indefinite confinement, the majority refused to expand the legal concept of
mental illness to include antisocial personality. See id.; see also James W. Ellis, Limits on
the State's Power to Confine "Dangerous" Persons: Constitutional Implications of Foucha
v. Louisiana, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 635, 653 (1992) ("[The Court] also declined to
permit a diagnosis of 'anti-social personality' to substitute for mental illness as a predicate
for civil commitment.").
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insanity, but also any convicted criminal who has a "personality
disorder that may lead to criminal conduct" but that might not meet
the legal standard of mental illness.2 10 The majority noted that the
next step would be to "substitut[e] confinement for dangerousness
for our present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside
from permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only
those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have violated
criminal law. '2 1'
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the
majority's opinion in Foucha was meant to be applied narrowly to the
specific Louisiana legislative scheme in question. 12 The uncertainty
of a psychiatric diagnosis required courts to defer to state legislative
judgment about the relationship between dangerous behavior and
mental illness.21 3 Thus, the State could not hold an insanity acquittee
without "some medical justification," but it could be permissible to
hold an acquittee after he has regained sanity as long as the nature
and duration of his commitment was limited to reflect "pressing
public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing
dangerousness.
214
In dissent, Justice Thomas215 wrote that Foucha's liberty interest
210. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82-83. Due to the uncertainty of psychiatric diagnosis, the
Court has opted to defer to legislative judgment about mental illness definitions. See
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983). See generally Janus, supra note 51,
at 185 (discussing the willingness of the states in sex offender statutes to challenge the
Court to develop constitutional standards for mental illness); Eric S. Janus, Toward a
Conceptual Framework for Assessing Police Power Commitment Legislation: A Critique
of Schopp's and Winick's Explications of Legal Mental Illness, 76 NEB. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997)
(discussing the role of medicine and science in developing a framework for the boundaries
of the state's use of police power to commit people civilly); Blakey, supra note 126, at
259-64 (discussing the Court's consideration of mental illness definitions and concluding
that it is a term that must be defined legally, not medically).
211. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82-83; see also La Fond, supra note 28, at 693 ("Such a system
of confinement would, in effect, be based solely on perceived dangerousness and would
lead to an Orwellian world of 'dangerousness courts,' a technique of social control
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of ordered liberty.").
212. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
213. See id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
214. Id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
215. Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. See id.
at 102 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy also wrote a dissenting opinion and was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See id. at 90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). These four,
along with Justice O'Connor, later formed the majority in Hendricks. See Hendricks, 117
S. Ct. at 2076.
Justice Thomas first stated that the Court's procedural due process analysis of the
statute in question was actually an equal protection analysis. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 107
(Thomas, J., dissenting). He disagreed with the proposition that Foucha was entitled to
1998] 1999
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
was not a fundamental right, as the majority asserted. 16 If freedom
from bodily restraint were a fundamental interest, then every prison
sentence would be subject to strict scrutiny.217 He further asserted
that as a more specific class, insanity acquittees did not have a
fundamental right to freedom from bodily restraint because strict
scrutiny had never been applied by the Court when it evaluated state
laws governing involuntary confinement 18 Moreover, because
Foucha was entitled to release at least once every year or at any time
upon request by the facility superintendent, Justice Thomas disputed
the majority's contention that Foucha's confinement would be
indefinite 19 Thus, Justice Thomas concluded that the Court was
perhaps striking down the law because it feared that the law could be
applied to someone else in an unconstitutional manner, even though
the law was constitutional as applied to Foucha.220
Despite Justice Thomas's objections, Foucha has become part of
the Court's due process jurisprudence as it applies to civil
commitment. First, due process prohibits the State from committing
someone without two substantive elements, mental illness and a
threat of dangerousness to society.22' Second, for involuntary civil
commitment, the State must prove the existence of the above two
conditions by clear and convincing evidence.m Finally, one acquitted
of a crime because of insanity can be held as long as the above two
conditions exist, but once mental illness has gone into remission, the
State may not continue to hold someone indefinitely based upon
the same treatment as other civil committees because as an insanity acquittee, he had
been found to have committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, but had avoided
criminal liability because mental illness caused him to commit the crime. See id. at 108
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Acquittees can be distinguished from those civilly committed
because by performing a criminal act, they have "'already ... manifested the reality of
anti-social conduct.'" Id. at 110 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Dixon v. Jacobs, 427
F.2d 589, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). So even though the State has no interest in punishing an
insanity acquittee, it is not required to ignore the criminal act and absolve itself of the
responsibility of protecting the public. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (relying on Hickey
v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 1983)). Because of his distrust of a psychiatrist's
ability to make a precise determination that someone has "regained sanity," Justice
Thomas argued that the State has a great interest in not releasing insanity acquittees
prematurely. See id. at 109-10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
216. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 117 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 118 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 119 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 123 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 124 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
221. See supra notes 121-220 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
the substantive due process requirements for civil commitment).
222- See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,433 (1979).
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dangerousness alone.21 The Court typically has been deferential to
state definitions of mental illness, and thus it has not developed a
clear standard of what mental illness is. 4
Just as the Court has refused to waver from requiring mental
illness and future dangerousness as the substantive basis for civil
commitment, it has been relatively consistent in the test that it has
used to determine if a statute is punitive or civil.3 Basically, the test
starts with a question of statutory construction: Did the legislature
intend the statute to be civil or criminal?' If the State expressly
intended the statute to be civil, the inquiry does not stop, but the
party challenging the statute must provide "the clearest proof' that
the act is "so punitive ... in purpose or effect as to negate thatintent[].'227
When Hendricks was decided, s the Court often used factors
developed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez to decide if the law in
223. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77; Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,368 (1983).
224. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081; cf. Jones, 463 U.S. at 364 n.13; Blakey, supra
note 126, at 259-64 (discussing the Court's consideration of mental illness definitions and
concluding that it is a term that must be defined legally, not medically).
225. The Court departed from this test in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989),
in which the Court determined when a civil penalty becomes punitive. See id. at 439. In
Halper, the Court stated that because the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy was "instrinsically personal," the civil-criminal determination is reached by
evaluating "the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the
machinery of the state." Id. at 447. The Court then affirmed the district court's
determination that damages become punitive when they exceed any amount that
"'"c."could reasonably be regarded as the equivalent of compensation for the
Government's loss."' I" Id. at 439 (quoting United States v. Halper, 664 F. Supp. 852, 854
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)), vacated, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)).
The Court has since determined that the Halper analysis applies only to civil penalty
cases, see United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2142 (1996), and furthermore that
Halper was a "deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles [and it] was ill
considered," United States v. Hudson, 118 S. Ct. 488,494 (1997). As a result, the Hudson
Court "in large part disavow[ed] the method of analysis used in ... Halper and
reaffirm[ed] the previously established rule exemplified in United States v. Ward." Id. at
491.
226. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (asking whether
Congress labeled the statute at issue as civil or criminal); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S.
391, 399 (1938) (holding that the question of whether a sanction is criminal or civil is a
question of statutory construction).
227. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249; see also Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2148 (evaluating a forfeiture
statute).
228. A few months following the Hendricks decision, the Court stated that the
Mendoza-Martinez factors are "useful guideposts" in deciding whether a civil statute is
punitive in effect. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493. The majority in Hendricks, however, did
not use these factors, although it did make a passing reference to the one factor regarding
scienter. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
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question was punitive in effect. 229 The case involved two individuals,
whose citizenship status was revoked in accordance with a federal
statute, because they left the United States to avoid military
service." Even though the statute allowing this action was labeled
civil, the Court held that revocation of citizenship was a punitive
action; thus, the State was required to provide the defendants with
procedural protections such as a jury trial."' In reaching this
determination the Court laid out seven factors that were not
exclusive but that should be considered in relation to a statute if it
was not readily apparent that Congress intended the statute to be
punitive. 3 Those factors are as follows: (1) whether the sanction
involves "affirmative disability or restraint;" (2) "whether it has
historically been regarded as punishment;" (3) "whether [the penalty]
comes into play only [after] a finding of scienter;" (4) whether the
operation of the penalty promotes retribution or deterrence; (5)
"whether the behavior to which [the penalty] applies is already a
crime;" (6) whether an alternative purpose is assignable for the
penalty; and (7) whether the penalty is "excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned." 3  The Court in United States v.
Ward34 described the Mendoza-Martinez factors as useful guideposts
for evaluating civil statutes that are challenged as actually being
punitive and thus potentially violating double jeopardy.235 The
plaintiff in Ward alleged that civil penalties levied under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act were actually criminal in purpose and
effect, but the Court disagreed.36 In reaching this decision, it first
looked for explicit congressional intent, and then evaluated the Act
with regard to the Mendoza-Martinez factors3 7
In United States v. Ursery,238 the Court applied a modified
version of the Mendoza-Martinez factors in the evaluation of an in
rem forfeiture of private property used to facilitate the commission
of a drug felony.239 The Court did not explicitly state that it was using
229. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
230. See id. at 144-51.
231. See id. at 165-66.
232. See id. at 168-69.
233. Id.
234. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
235. See id. at 249.
236. See id. at 244 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)).
237. See id. at 248-49. The Court concluded that one factor-whether the act to which
the penalty applies is a crime-weighed in favor of finding the act as punitive; however,
this one factor was not enough to make the entire act unconstitutional. See id. at 249-51.
238. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
239. See id. at 2148 (discussing the federal statutes that authorized the forfeiture at
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Mendoza-Martinez as a guide, but its analysis did take into
consideration similar factors such as whether civil forfeiture is
retributive or deterrent, whether forfeiture traditionally has been
regarded as punishment, and whether the statute is linked to criminal
activity.24° It held that these factors did not offer the "clearest proof"
that the "forfeiture proceedings ... [were] so punitive in form and
effect as to render them criminal."2''  Also, in rem actions
traditionally have been viewed as civil proceedings2 42 Furthermore,
the "procedural mechanisms" in the challenged statutes revealed that
Congress intended the forfeiture to be civil.243
The Court had previously used a modification of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors in Allen v. Illinois,2 44 a case that involved Illinois's
Sexually Dangerous Person Act.245 The statute authorized the State
to commit offenders who qualified as sexually dangerous persons in
lieu of sending them to prison 46 Allen argued that the statute was
actually punitive, despite its civil label; thus, his statements to
psychiatrists assessing his mental health were protected under his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and should not
have been used by the district court when it was deciding if he should
be committed.247 Once again, the Court began its analysis with
statutory construction.24 The Court determined that the statute was
both labeled as civil and that it did not further either of the criminal
law's goals of retribution or deterrence.249 The majority emphasized
that treatment, not punishment, was the primary purpose of
commitment.10 The Court reasoned that the introduction of past
issue in this case).
240. See id. at 2148-49; cf. supra text accompanying note 233 (describing the Mendoza-
Martinez factors).
241. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2148.
242. See id. at 2147 (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354, 363 (1984)). For a comprehensive discussion of civil forfeiture as an in rem civil
proceeding, see generally Joi Elizabeth Peake, Note, Bound by the Sins of Another: Civil
Forfeiture and the Lack of Constitutional Protection for Innocent Owners in Bennis v.
Michigan, 75 N.C. L. REV. 662 (1997).
243. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
244. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
245. See id. at 365.
246. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/0.01-12 (West 1992). Minnesota follows a
similar approach and uses commitment in lieu of punishment. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 253B.18-.185 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); see also Blakey, supra note 126, at 231-37
(explaining the history and procedure of Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality
Statute).
247. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 365-68 (referring to U.S. CONST. amend. V).
248. See id. at 368.
249. See id. at 368-70.
250. See id. at 373.
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criminal acts did not make the measure punitive, as the prior acts
were used merely to show a propensity for future sexually deviant
behavior.251
Sexual predator statutes raise concerns not only about
punishment, but also about infringement on an offender's substantive
due process rights because this legislation does not fit neatly into the
traditional constructs of civil or criminal jurisprudenceP2
Traditionally, criminal offenders are placed in one of two categories:
they are either culpable for their conduct and thus confined in
accordance with criminal law, or they show that they are not
responsible due to a mental illness and thus are committed in
accordance with the civil system.3 Sex offenders, however, fall in
between these two categories because they traditionally have been
held criminally responsible for their crimes even though a mental
abnormality, such as pedophilia, may have influenced their
conduct.14 This inconsistency led some states, such as Illinois and
Minnesota, to use commitment and treatment in lieu of prison time,
which, as evidenced in Allen, makes the statute appear less
punitive 55 Kansas's statute is more troublesome because it delays
treatment until after the offender's prison term, enabling the State to
lengthen the offender's confinement in the name of treatment. 6 In
Hendricks, the Court missed an opportunity to address the unique
problems posed by sexual predators5 7 and instead treated Hendricks
as an extension of, rather than an exception to, traditional civil
commitment. Thus, the Court not only further confused substantive
251. See id. at 371.
252. Cf. Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (explaining that
mentally ill defendants are not held morally responsible for their acts because they cannot
tell right from wrong); Blakey, supra note 126, at 228-29 (describing the legal categories
that defendants usually fall into as either "mad" or "bad," depending upon their degree of
culpability).
253. See United States v. Palesky, 855 F.2d 34, 35 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that
commitment to a mental hospital is automatic and mandatory once a defendant is found
not guilty by reason of insanity); Anthony v. State, 456 So. 2d 582,583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (same); United States v. Mendelsohn, 443 A.2d 1311, 1311-12 (D.C. 1982) (same);
Blakey, supra note 126, at 228-29.
254. See Blakey, supra note 126, at 229-30.
255. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §205/3 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253B.18-.185 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); Allen, 478 U.S. at 373; see also Blakey, supra
note 126, at 231-37 (explaining the history and procedure of Minnesota's Sexual
Psychopathic Personality Statute).
256. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2093-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
257. According to Linda Sleffel, sexual psychopath statutes developed during the early
1900s as states struggled to deal with sex offenders who were considered to be "a special
class of offenders thought to be especially dangerous." SLEFFEL, supra note 121, at 41.
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due process jurisprudence,258  but it also failed to clarify the
conceptual "muddle" of punishmentP 9
In terms of due process, until Hendricks, the Court had not
wavered in requiring both mental illness and future dangerousness as
the bases for involuntary civil commitment 60 One commentator
labeled this approach as therapeutic jurisprudence because the State
is using its parens patriae authority26' to commit people who, because
of a mental illness, fall outside the bounds of the criminal law.2 62
Jurisprudence of prevention, however, is based upon the State using
its police power to confine people who are a threat to themselves or
others, whether or not the disorder that causes the predicted violence
arises from a mental illness.263 In Hendricks, the Court deferred
greatly to Kansas's police power, even though it discussed the
substantive due process issue in terms of Foucha and Addington."
In Foucha and Addington, the Court upheld the commitment of
mentally ill persons as an action authorized by the state's parens
patriae and police powers pursuant to either involuntary civil
commitment or a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict.265 Both
state powers were implicated because Foucha and Addington were
found to be dangerous as well as incapable of taking care of
258. Several commentators predicted that the Court would use sexual predator
statutes as an opportunity to clarify the bounds of civil commitment. See, e.g., Janus,
supra note 51, at 185-86 (proposing that the Court adopt the following rule for the
substantive boundary for civil commitment: "Mental disorders justify civil commitment
only when they disable the state from pursuing its legitimate interests through the
primary system for liberty deprivation-the criminal justice system"); Blakey, supra note
126, at 642-43 (stating that the Court must determine whether there is a limit to state
police power and if so, whether states that have adopted sexual predator acts have
exceeded the scope of police power); Morris, supra note 19, at 639 ("IT]he Supreme
Court conceivably will be prompted to more carefully delineate the limitations on the
state's authority to incapacitate individuals.").
259. See Steiker, supra note 159, at 781.
260. See The Supreme Court 1996 Term-Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 266
(1997) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
261. See supra note 138 (definingparenspatriae authority).
262. See Janus, supra note 51, at 160.
263. See id. The Court applied the jurisprudence of prevention before Hendricks, but
usually only in cases that involved confinement for a limited period of time. See United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,741 (1987) (allowing the pre-trial confinement of criminal
defendants based upon dangerousness alone); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26,
39 (1905) (upholding a state statute authorizing the confinement of people suffering from
contagious diseases). For indefinite commitment, though, the Court has typically applied
therapeutic jurisprudence. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979).
264. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079-81.
265. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77-79; Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
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themselves because of their mental illnesses.266  In contrast,
Hendricks was dangerous due to his propensity to commit sex crimes,
but his mental condition did not render him incapable of caring for
himself.267  Thus, the State could not commit Hendricks through
traditional civil commitment solely upon its parens patriae power. 6
Instead, the State commited him because he was dangerousness due
to his propensity to commit sex crimes, but the Court examined his
detainment as if his mental condition mirrored that of Foucha and
Addington.2 69 Sexual violent predator statutes, however, more
closely resemble the exception the Court carved out in Salerno that
permits the confinement of a select group of offenders based upon
their dangerousness alone.270
By not distinguishing Hendricks and the purpose of the Act from
traditional civil commitment, the Court reduced the constitutionally
acceptable point at which the State can commit someone from mental
illness to mental abnormality?'n In fact, Kansas already had a civil
commitment statute that defines a mentally ill person as someone
who suffers from "a severe mental disorder" requiring treatment,
who cannot "make an informed decision [about] treatment," and who
"is likely to cause harm to self or others. ' 272 In the preamble to the
Act, however, the Kansas Legislature clearly stated that sexual
predators cannot be committed under the civil commitment statute
because they do not meet the statutory requirements for mental
illness.273 Instead of "mental illness," sexual predators suffer from a
mental abnormality, or more specifically "antisocial personality
features" that cannot be treated under "existing mental illness
modalities and ... render them likely to engage in sexually violent
behavior."'274 The Court unequivocally rejected antisocial personality
266. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77-79; Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
267. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994) (stating that sexual predators could not
be committed through traditional civil commitment proceedings).
268. See id.
269. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80; Addington, 441
U.S. at 426-27) (stating that involuntary commitment statutes that apply to a small group
of offenders do not violate the Court's understanding of liberty).
270. See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text (discussing United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
271. See Leading Cases, supra note 260, at 259; see also La Fond, supra note 28, at 671-
72 (explaining that mental abnormality has no clinical or diagnostic meaning); Wettstein,
supra note 28, at 602 (" 'Mental abnormality' is much broader than any conceivable
psychiatric diagnosis of mental disorder or mental illness.").
272. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(h) (1994).
273. See id. § 59-29a01.
274. Id.
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as being the equivalent of mental illness for the purposes of
commitment in Foucha.7 5  However, the majority in Hendricks
accepted antisocial personality disorder as a basis for commitment 76
even though mental abnormality as defined by the Act differed
significantly from mental illness under the state's civil commitment
statute.277
The majority correctly stated that it has allowed the states
discretion in defining the relationship between mental illness and
dangerousness,2 78 but courts also have considered testimony by
psychiatrists in deciding to reject antisocial personality disorder or
pedophilia as mental illnesses,27 9 or in evaluating whether someone is
truly mentally ill or simply displaying idiosyncratic behavior.m° Also,
in past decisions the Court showed more deference and respect for
the individual's liberty interest."t For example, the majority in
Addington emphasized that people sometimes exhibit "behavior
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or
emotional disorder .... [However] such behavior is no basis for
compelled treatment and surely none for confinement." Sexual
predator statutes rely upon the State's ability to confine people
through its police power; thus, the reduced interest in individual
liberty is a natural consequence because the threat of dangerousness
is what matters, not the individual's illness and need for treatment.m
One can argue that a narrow reading of Hendricks allows the
State to use civil commitment as the modem solution to the
"particularly noxious and fearsome public problem" of "sexual
predation."'  Nevertheless, until further clarified by the Court,
275. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,79 (1992).
276. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081.
277. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (defining mental abnormality as a
"congenital or acquired condition" that affects "the emotional or volitional capacity" and
"predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree" that makes the
person "a menace to the health and safety of others").
278. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081 (stating that courts defer to legislative judgment
about mental illness because of the uncertainty of psychiatric diagnosis); Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354,365 n.13 (1983) (same).
279. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 74-75; In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan. 1996),
rev'd sub nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); see also Cornwell, supra note
19, at 1312-16 (highlighting lower court decisions that evaluated whether antisocial
personality or personality disorder qualified as mental illness under due process).
280. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979).
281. See Leading Cases, supra note 260, at 267.
282- Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27.
283. See Janus, supra note 51, at 165 ("Mental [abnormality] is simply window dressing
284. Cornwell, supra note 19, at 1336; see also McCaffrey, supra note 1, at 912
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Hendricks has created an imbalance in the two-prong due process
test heretofore mandated by the Court by allowing states to commit a
sexual offender primarily on the predicted danger that he or she
poses to others with only a token reference to the offender's mental
condition.z5 This shift in focus is directly contrary to the Court's
reasoning in Foucha when it warned against basing commitment on
dangerousness alone. 6
This shift in balance may appear to 'be harmless, but it could
spiral out of control without more carefully defined limits.28
Another plausible result is that Hendricks provides state courts with
a "basis for deployment of civil commitment procedures in other
contexts." The Kansas legislature and the Court readily accept the
contention that this class of sexually violent predators is very small
and easy to identify, but as the majority in Foucha recognized,
antisocial personality is a vague condition that could lead to the
confinement of inmates or any insanity acquittees found to have an
antisocial personality disorder but not a treatable mental illness. 289
At least one commentator has argued that "mental abnormality" is
"too broad and elastic to avoid improperly encompassing a wide
(describing the Act as "the best available alternative for protecting communities from this
... extremely dangerouso group of offenders"); Blakey, supra note 126, at 296
(concluding that Minnesota's sexual psychopath statute is "a powerful [social] instrument
to achieve the sound social goals of the community").
285. Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994) (acknowledging that sexual predators do
not have a recognizable mental illness that can be treated); supra notes 221-22 and
accompanying text (explaining the traditional due process test).
286. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992); supra notes 208-11 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding in Foucha); see also Ellis, supra note
209, at 653 (recognizing that the Court in Foucha refused to expand the State's power to
confine citizens based on dangerousness alone and refused to recognize antisocial
personality as a mental illness); Janus, supra note 51, at 174-77 (explaining the Court's
rejection of Louisiana's reliance on jurisprudence of prevention, which bases civil
commitment upon dangerousness pursuant to the State's police power).
287. See Ellis, supra note 209, at 635 (arguing that the Court has not "announced
comprehensive constitutional principles" addressing the balance between the state's
interest in protecting the public and the individual's liberty interest); La Fond, supra note
28, at 698-99 (describing the "Teflon Slippery Slope" that will allow states to "use lifetime
preventive detention on any group of offenders who have served their prison terms");
Steiker, supra note 159, at 818-19 (pointing out that Kansas's Act is moving toward a
"slippery slope" of "pure preventive detention"); Morris, supra note 19, at 642-43
(predicting that the Court will define states' authority or develop a hybrid framework for
treating sexual predators).
288. Leading Cases, supra note 260, at 266.
289. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82-83; see also La Fond, supra note 28, at 693 (arguing
that a system of confinement not based on mental illness would lead to "an Orwellian
world of 'dangerousness courts,'" which would conflict with our constitutional principles
of liberty).
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variety of individuals, resulting in indeterminate incarceration"
because it can include "nearly any symptom, deficit, or historical
detail. '290  For instance, the Court's rationale in Hendricks would
support a statute that authorized the commitment of drunk drivers,
spouse abusers, or drug addicts if it is shown that they suffer from an
"abnormal personality."2 91 According to the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
("DSM-IV"), people who have an antisocial personality may have a
history of arrests, may disregard others' feelings, may be aggressive,
and may have a record of physical assaults, such as spouse beating.29
People with this disorder may also "display a reckless disregard for
the safety of themselves or others .... [Such recklessness] may be
evidenced in their driving behavior (recurrent speeding, driving while
intoxicated, multiple accidents)."2 93 While lawmakers may recognize
that civil commitment is not the best alternative for drunk drivers, by
"ratchet[ing] down the mental illness requirement" the Court has
nonetheless opened the door for states to expand their use of civil
commitment as a means of social control.294 In Hendricks, only
Justice Kennedy recognized that "mental abnormality" may prove to
be "too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding that
civil detention is justified. 2 95
Justice Kennedy raised a second concern as to "whether it is the
criminal system or the civil system which should make the decision"
about how long an offender should be confined.2 96 Allowing the civil
commitment of offenders after they have served prison time could in
effect result in a life sentence, a result that did not trouble members
of the Kansas Task Force.297 However, the function of the civil
290. Wettstein, supra note 28, at 602.
291. See La Fond, supra note 28, at 699; Leading Cases, supra note 260, at 259; Mark
Hansen, Danger vs. Due Process, Deciding Who Is Mentally Abnormal Is Key to Law,
A.B.A. 3., Aug. 1997, at 43,43.
292. See DSM-IV, supra note 28, at 646; Hammel, supra note 56, at 809 (stating that
"fifty-eight percent of incarcerated felons display" antisocial personality traits (relying on
NATHANIEL J. PALLONE, MENTAL DISORDERS AMONG PRISONERS: TowARD AN
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVENTORY 35 fig.4 (1991))); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae
Washington State Psychiatric Ass'n in Support of Respondent at 18-19, Hendricks (Nos.
95-1649, 95-9075) (arguing that courts should not allow commitment based upon
antisocial personality disorder because no evidence exists that people suffering from this
disorder are unable to conform to societal controls).
293. DSM-IV, supra note 28, at 646.
294. Leading Cases, supra note 260, at 266.
295. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
296. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
297. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (repeating the words of Kansas Task Force
member Jim Blaufuss, who said that if offenders get a life sentence, "' So be it.' ").
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system is not to punish an offender "after the State makes an
improvident plea bargain on the criminal side."29s Both the criminal
and civil systems have incapacitation as a goal, but using
incapacitation as a form of retribution and deterrence is reserved for
the criminal system alone.2 99 However, in practice, deterrence and
retribution have found a place in civil law in the form of civil fines,
forfeitures, and punitive damages. 00 Similarly, the criminal law has
become influenced by the mental health system through a shift to
verdicts such as guilty but mentally 11. 301 By allowing for civil
commitment after incarceration, Kansas has blurred the lines
between the civil and criminal process even more.302 The Hendricks
majority determined that civil commitment under the Act is purely
civil in purpose and effect,3 3 but by focusing on deterrence and
retribution in reaching this decision, the Court ignored the need for a
clearer test that draws from both criminal and civil paradigms to
determine when a civil sanction becomes punitive.304 The Court's
298. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Hendricks did not receive the maximum sentence
because of a plea arrangement. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996), rev'd
sub nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); supra note 27 (explaining the
details of Hendricks's plea arrangement).
299. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
300. See Steiker, supra note 159, at 784-87.
301. See id.; Morris, supra note 19, at 624-25.
302. See Leading Cases, supra note 260, at 259; cf. Steiker, supra note 159, at 780
(describing the trend of the legal system to draw from cognitive and behavioral sciences
to explain behavior and confine dangerous offenders). Academics have been troubled by
the blurring of the civil and criminal distinction for some time. See generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And
What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1891-92 (1992) (suggesting that the
focus be placed upon enforcement incentives that would encourage regulatory agencies to
use civil penalties rather than criminal processes); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1803-
13 (1992) (describing hybrid jurisprudence that has a punitive purpose but follows civil
procedure); Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76
B.U. L. REV. 201, 214 (1996) (advocating the maintenance of the civil and criminal
distinction because of the criminal law's focus on moral blameworthiness).
303. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085; supra notes 47-86 and accompanying text
(discussing the majority's holding); cf. Blakey, supra note 126, at 243 ("The civil-criminal
distinction is, in some sense, artificial; ... it is an artifact made by law not found in
nature.").
304. See Mann, supra note 302, at 1871 ("While the legal community has always
recognized that many sanctions do not fit into either [criminal or civil] paradigm, it has
never developed a systematic jurisprudence to explain the substantive and procedural
position of punitive civil sanction within the field of sanctioning."); Steiker, supra note
159, at 819 (proposing a framework for determining when a sanction becomes punitive);
see also United States v. Hudson, 118 S. Ct. 488, 494 (1997) (recognizing "that all civil
penalties have some deterrent effect") (citing United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135,
2145 n.2 (1996); Department of Revenue v. Kurth, 511 U.S. 767,777 (1994)).
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disagreement over what constitutes punishment was also evident in
United States v. Hudson, a post-Hendricks case in which the majority
disavowed Halper and used the Mendoza-Martinez factors as
guideposts to determine whether a statute was punitive.3 5 The
opinion included four concurring opinions discussing how the Court
should define punishment, thus leaving the definition unresolved.3 6
Traditionally, the goals of the civil paradigm have been to use
corrective or compensatory actions to address a private wrong
between two parties.3 °7 On the other hand, criminal law involves
moral blame for a public wrong.3°8 According to one commentator's
theory, "civil commitment is interstitial to the criminal law" because
criminal law is the primary means used by the State to control violent
behavior, but civil commitment can be used when "the state's
interests cannot be vindicated by the criminal law. 3 9  Civil
commitment of a criminal offender rather than imprisonment is
justified when the defendant's conduct is the result of a mental
disorder, thus making the offender "unamenable to prosecution."31
Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act, however, undermines this
structure by allowing civil commitment after prison time has been
served. In essence, the State takes an offender who was held
criminally responsible for his conduct and transforms him into a
blameless offender who cannot control himself and is likely to
commit more crimes due to a mental abnormality.311 Justice
Kennedy appropriately noted in Hendricks that a concern arises as to
305. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 491, 493; supra text accompanying note 233 and
accompanying text (stating the Mendoza-Martinez factors).
306. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496-97 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 497-500 (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment); id. at 500-01 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 501-02
(Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
307. See Mann, supra note 302, at 1805-13 (explaining the differences between
criminal and civil law); see also Paul H. Robinson, Supreme Court Review: Foreword:
The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 693, 695-96 (1993) (explaining the options for dealing with blameless
offenders).
308. See Mann, supra note 302, at 1805-13; Steiker, supra note 159, at 785-87; see also
Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ("This sense of justice
assumes there is a faculty called reason ... that enables an individual to distinguish
between right and wrong and endows him with moral responsibility for his acts.").
309. Janus, supra note 51, at 209.
310. Id. at 210; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 110 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the State has no interest in punishing an insanity acquittee);supra
notes 158-60 and accompanying text (explaining the implication of a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity).
311. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1994) (defining a "sexually violent predator"
as anyone "who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes
the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence").
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whether commitment is being used to compensate for shortcomings
on the criminal side. 2
The majority decided the Act was not punitive by asking
whether the legislature intended the statute to be civil and whether
the party challenging the statute provided the "clearest proof" that it
was so punitive in purpose or effect to negate that intent.1 3 But then,
by focusing on retribution and deterrence, the Court failed to provide
judicial guidance as to specific factors that characterize
punishment.314 In contrast, Justice Breyer in dissent focused on
characteristics of the Act that he concluded made it punitive despite
express legislative intent to the contrary. 15 For instance, at the time
of Hendricks's commitment, Kansas had not funded treatment for
him, it did not have any pending treatment contracts, and it had only
hired a semblance of a treatment staff.316  Also, the State did not
consider a less restrictive alternative to commitment such as a half-
way house.317 Finally, he considered the seven factors advocated by
the Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez and concluded that
Kansas was seeking only to confine Hendricks.318  Still, Justice
Breyer's approach offered nothing more than guideposts that fail to
provide a rationale for what actually constitutes punishment. As
civil-criminal hybrids become more prevalent, the parameters of
punishment need to be more clearly delineated in order to assure a
meaningful analysis of double jeopardy and ex post facto claims. 39
Professor Steiker has attempted to develop a framework that
courts can use to evaluate a sanction and determine if it crosses the
312. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
313. See id. at 2082; supra notes 225-51 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's struggles
with punishment in United States v. Hudson, 118 U.S. 488 (1997)).
315. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2090-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
316. See id. at 2093 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
317. See id. at 2094 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
318. See id. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting); supra text accompanying note 233 (listing
factors). This analysis is in line with the Allen Court's approach because it found the
treatment provision in lieu of sentencing to be compelling. See Allen v. Illinois 478 U.S.
364, 369-70 (1986); Hammel, supra note 56, at 800-01. Justice Breyer found the delay in
treatment also to be troubling because it conflicted with Kansas's acknowledgment that
sexual offenders need long-term treatment outside of a prison setting. See KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994); cf. Wettstein, supra note 28, at 616-17 (emphasizing the need for
immediate treatment).
319. Cf. Steiker, supra note 159, at 781-84 (explaining the need for a clear test for
punishment because of the "destabilization of the criminal-civil distinction"). Professor
Steiker explains that the framers of the Constitution were able to make a distinction
between criminal and civil sanctions, but now courts have more difficulty maintaining this
distinction. See id. at 783.
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threshold of punishment.320 Her test asks the following three
questions: (1) "[W]hat is the state's intent? '32 1 (2) "[W]hat is the
effect of the forfeiture [or sanction] on the defendant? ' 322 and
(3) "[W]hat is the public message or social meaning of the forfeiture
of the defendant's property [or confinement of the defendant] by the
government? ' '31 She applied the first two questions to Hendricks
and came up with the same conclusion as the majority.32 4 However,
she failed to address the social meaning of Hendricks's commitment
as directed by the third question, despite her conclusion that sexually
violent predator statutes may be leading to a "slippery slope [of] pure
preventive detention. ' 31
Another commentator, Professor Schulhofer, addressed the
"social meaning" of sexual offender statutes and concluded that
"regulatory use of confinement [such as civil commitment] ... should
never displace the criminal process '326 because the essential
component of this country's justice system is respect of "the
individual's capacity for autonomous choice."3 7  Social control is
maintained through the criminal justice system, which takes away a
person's liberty only when she chooses to commit a harmful act, with
the punishment being proportional to "the degree of personal
fault."3" Traditional civil commitment does not violate the belief in
autonomous choice because it steps into action only when the
criminal process cannot adequately address a social problem.39 For
example, a civil law authorizing the quarantine of someone with a
320. See id. at 819 ("I have offered Mendoza-Martinez some life-support by providing
it with a rationale grounded in moral theory; we have yet to see what quality of life it can
lead.").
321. Id. at 815.
322. Id. at 816.
323. Id.
324. See id. at 817-18 (concluding that, despite a suspicion that Kansas merely wanted
to lengthen sex offenders' sentences, the State's intent was non-punitive and the effect
was prevention, not blame).
325. Id. at 818-19.
326. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J.
CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 69, 93 (1996).
327. Id. at 90; accord Janus, supra note 51, at 192 (positing that commitment may
actually be more harmful to a sex offender's dignity because "[i]n criminal proceedings,
the operative assumption is that the defendant is a free agent, a full human being").
328. Schulhofer, supra note 326, at 90-91; see also Mann, supra note 302, at 1805
(explaining that a criminal offense requires mens rea); Blakey, supra note 126, at 228-30
(describing the two paradigms that offenders fall into as either "mad" or "bad").
329. See Schulhofer, supra note 326, at 93; see also Janus, supra note 51, at 209
(explaining that civil commitment is secondary to criminal confinement, which is society's
primary means of social control).
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communicable disease does not offend principles of autonomy
because the contagious person is not at fault for contracting the
malady, but she also cannot avoid giving it to others.33 However,
Professor Schulhofer contended that sexually violent predator
statutes are overbroad and extend regulatory confinement to people
who can make choices and respond to criminal sanctions.33' This
extension of civil commitment, "[i]n the absence of mental illness
sufficiently serious to preclude criminal responsibility,... violates the
first principle of limited government-to treat every mentally
competent adult as a free and autonomous person responsible for his
chosen actions-and only for his chosen actions. 332
The problems with the Hendricks Court's analysis of whether the
Act constitutes punishment parallel the opinion's due process
problems.333 The majority tried to force the unique problem of sexual
predators into the traditional paradigms of civil and criminal process.
By doing so, it endorsed the paradox of punishing a sex offender first
and then committing him after he has served his time, as if he is an
insanity acquittee lacking culpability. Perhaps the Court sees
sexually violent predator statutes as the best way to control the
behavior of offenders who fall in between the traditional extremes of
criminal responsibility and mental insanity.33M However, similar to its
shortcomings in its due process analysis, the Hendricks Court did not
make clear to what extent it is willing to allow the civil and the
criminal to blur together. Furthermore, it missed an opportunity to
clarify what constitutes a showing of "clearest proof" in a challenge
to a civilly-labeled sanction that may be criminal in effect.335
At the very least, Hendricks resolved the discrepancy among the
lower courts as to the constitutionality of sexually violent predator
statutes, 336 but the Court endorsed the Kansas model with such broad
330. See Schulhofer, supra note 326, at 91.
331. See id. at 94-95 ("Preventive incapacitation of such individuals, as a substitute for
reliance on the criminal process, is inconsistent with the core commitments of a free
society, even if the eligibility criteria can be identified with the certainty and reliability of
a litmus test.").
332. Id. at 96; accord Janus, supra note 51, at 194-95 (arguing that treatment may
benefit sex offenders, but they are generally considered to be competent and thus are
entitled to make their own decisions about treatment).
333. See supra notes 260-82 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's substantive
due process analysis).
334. See Blakey, supra note 126, at 228-29.
335. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text (discussing the factors the Court
usually considers when determining whether a sanction is civil or criminal).
336. See supra note 103 (discussing conflicting lower court rulings on sexual predator
laws).
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language that it may have opened the door to increased use of civil
commitment by the states as a means of social control.337 The Court
reduced the due process requirement of mental illness to mental
abnormality in order to fit Hendricks in the Addington line of civil
commitment cases.338 Such a step was not necessary, as the Court had
already carved out a limited number of exceptions to traditional civil
commitment that predicated confinement on the basis of future
dangerousness. 339 Nonetheless, the Court chose to treat Hendricks as
an extension of traditional civil commitment-an extension that it
may very well have to revisit in the future if states take their
expanded police power too far. Furthermore, the Court endorsed the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act without any clear rationale for
when such a measure blurs civil and criminal principles to the point
that a "civil" sanction becomes criminal in effect. Double jeopardy
and ex post facto claims to punitive civil sanctions cannot be
adequately addressed until the Court recognizes that some sanctions,
even though labeled civil or criminal, fall into a middle ground
between civil and criminal law. Sexual predators pose a serious
threat to society; perhaps Stephanie Schmidt's father was correct in
labeling them the "worst of the worse."' Still, the Court could have
tailored its opinion more narrowly to focus on the specific problem of
sexual predation and thus avoided opening the door to future
curtailment of the liberty interests of the next group that society
deems to be a threat because of a personality defect less serious than
pedophilia.
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337. See Leading Cases, supra note 260, at 259; supra notes 287-95 and accompanying
text.
338. See supra notes 268-83 and accompanying text (discussing Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418 (1979), and subsequent cases).
339. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (upholding the pre-
trial confinement of criminal defendants based upon their dangerousness).
340. 60 Minutes, supra note 1 (recounting an interview with the father of the young
woman whose rape and murder prompted Kansas to pass the Act).
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